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  STANDARD OIL AS A TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATOR 
 
  F. M. Scherer 
 Harvard  University 
  September 2010 Revision 
 
 The  1911  Standard Oil case, everyone knows, was all about 
price discrimination, "predatory" pricing, acquisitions under 
duress, and the like.  But there was also a technological 
element.  Defending against monopolization charges, Standard Oil 
claimed that it had innovated both technologically and in the 
scale economies-enhancing investments by which it aggressively 
expanded its business: 
 
  They have been unremitting in their efforts to improve 
the processes of refining, to diversify the useful by-
products to be obtained from the refining of petroleum and 
to introduce them into general use, and these efforts have 
resulted to their great advantage as well as to the general 
benefit of the industry and the public at large....  They 
have made great efforts to solve the problem of refining 
refractory oils and through the success of these efforts 
they have been able to utilize to their great advantage 
oils that otherwise were useless except for fuel purposes.
1 
 
Emphasized among Standard's innovative accomplishments was the 
Frasch-Burton process (as I shall argue, a misnomer) for 
deriving satisfactory illuminating oil (kerosene) from the high-
sulphur oil found in the fields around Lima, Ohio. 
 
  In adjudicating the Standard Oil case, the courts could not 
ignore Standard's claims of superior entrepreneurship.  The 
Supreme Court observed, for example, that: 
 
  [I]n a powerful analysis of the facts, it is insisted 
[by Standard] that they demonstrate that the origin and 
development of the vast business which the defendants 
control was but the result of lawful competitive methods, 
                                                 
  * This paper is derived with extensive augmentation and amendment from Scherer 
(2008). 
 
1     .     .  Brief for Defendants on the Facts, U.S. v. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) et al., 
vol. I, pp. 109, 104. 
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guided by economic genius of the highest order, sustained 
by courage, by a keen insight into commercial situations, 
resulting in the acquisition of great wealth, but at the 
same time serving to stimulate and increase production, to 
widely extend the distribution of the products of petroleum 
at a cost largely below that which would have otherwise 
prevailed, thus proving to be at one and the same time a 
benefaction to the general public as well as of enormous 
advantage to individuals.
2 
 
Nevertheless, both the Circuit Court of first instance and the 
Supreme Court manifestly failed to address and resolve the 
contending claims.  The Supreme Court at least admitted the 
task's difficulty: 
 
  [T]o discover and state the truth concerning these 
contentions both arguments call for the analysis and 
weighing ... of a jungle of conflicting testimony covering 
a period of forty years, a duty difficult to rightly 
perform and, even if satisfactorily accomplished, almost 
impossible to state with any reasonable regard to brevity.
3 
 
Instead, asserting from historical and legal reasoning "an 
obvious truth" that individuals should not be allowed to secure 
monopolies by wrongful means, the Circuit Court concluded 
summarily, "Nor can arguments of reduced prices of product, 
economy in operation, and the like have weight," commencing its 
remedial order only two paragraphs later.
4   The Supreme Court 
affirmed, stressing in its precedent-setting rule of reason 
analysis how Standard's "acts and dealings" revealed the intent 
to "drive others from the field."
5 
 
  One might speculate that the courts in Standard Oil 
attempted no balancing of the evidence on innovation and cost 
reduction because the job had been done for them, despite the 
                                                 
2     .  Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 48 (1911). 
 
3     .  Ibid. 
 
4     .  U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 178 Fed. 177, 196 (1909). 
 
5     .  Supra note 2 at 76.  In his dissent, Justice Harlan criticized the majority for articulating its 
"rule of reason" to adjudicate monopolization cases without any evident basis in Congressional 
intent. 
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evident lack of judicial gratitude, in a massive study the 
Bureau of Corporations completed two years before the Circuit 
Court delivered its opinion.  The Bureau's staff observed inter 
alia that by far the largest declines in the margin between 
crude petroleum prices and refined product prices occurred 
between 1866 and 1872, "before the Standard can be said to have 
exercised any influence,
6 that in the first decade of the 20th 
Century there was very little difference between the unit costs 
of Standard refineries and those of its larger rivals (who, it 
argued, would have been even larger and joined by others but for 
Standard's restrictive practices),
7 and, on technological 
innovation:
8 
 
  It is a familiar fact that whenever any absolutely new 
industry springs up, particularly one of a complex 
character, the costs at the outset are exceedingly high and 
are rapidly reduced with the first few succeeding years.... 
It is doubtless true that the Standard Oil Company ... was 
able to secure economies somewhat greater than could have 
been secured by a number of smaller concerns.  It is, 
however, absurd to contend that no further economies in the 
industry would have been brought about after 1873 in the 
absence of the Standard or a similar combination....  The 
reduction of cost, even by small concerns, has been due to 
the natural development of the industry and to the general 
progress of science and invention -- not to the enormous 
aggregation of capital. 
 
  A New Analysis of Patenting Trends 
 
  Support for the Bureau's inferences on innovation is 
provided by an analysis of data the Bureau staff failed to 
consider (presumably because it was not fashionable in economics 
to do so at the time, as it is now).  From Jacob Schmookler's 
compilation of U.S. patents issued in various fields, Figure 1 
shows the number of petroleum refining patents issued during 
five-year periods between 1850 and 1929, along with the amount 
of crude oil produced in the United States during the same 
periods.
9  The plot is in logarithmic form, so a straight line 
implies a constant annual growth rate.   The growth of patenting 
                                                 
6     .  U.S. Commissioner of Corporations (1907), Part II, "Prices and Profits," p. 625. 
7     .  Ibid. pp. 650-655. 
8     .  Ibid., pp. 625-626. 
9     .  Schmookler (undated), Part II, for Patent Office classes 325 through 332.  
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is most rapid before Standard Oil was incorporated and began 
absorbing competitors in 1870.  By 1880, Standard had acquired 
at least 80 percent of U.S. refining capacity.  During its 
period of dominance, patenting shows no growth and is at lower 
absolute rates than in 1865-69.  After the dissolution of the 
New Jersey Standard Company in 1912, there is new growth and a 
substantial increase in the level of patenting. 
 
  More detailed scrutiny suggests that the core components of 
Standard Oil generated only a small share of the 443 refining 
patents identified in Schmookler's tabulation for the years 
1875-1899.  A search was conducted in the Patent Office's Annual 
Index of Patents covering those 25 years for any patent 
assignment to an entity with the name "Standard Oil..." along 
with 50 subsidiaries named for various time periods in Moody's 
The Truth About the Trusts (1904).
10  Patents pertaining to 
barrel-making, can-sealing, and petroleum applications 
inventions were excluded to maintain consistency with the 
Schmookler definitions.  With the benefit of the doubt resolved 
in cases of imperfect name matches in favor of counting patents 
as Standard-originated, from 48 to 54 patents, or at most 12 
percent of the comparable Schmookler count, had origins in 
Standard companies.   
 
  It is possible that some inventions made by Standard 
employees were not assigned to the parent, and indeed, several 
cases were found in which employees assigned some patents to 
Standard units and retained individual rights to others.  
However, in 1871 U.S. law was revised to allow companies to 
require assignment of employee-made inventions, so Standard 
clearly had the right to mamdate assignment, and 16 Standard 
units were found to have received assignments during the sample 
period.
11   Comprehensive data on patent assignments to 
corporations during the Standard monopoly period are sparse.  
The earliest data, derived from Historical Statistics of the 
United States (1960, p. 607), appear to be for 1901.  From then 
                                                 
10     .  The search utilized Index of Patents volumes located in the Patent Office's public search 
room, which were found to be in seriously deteriorated condition, and the better-maintained 
volumes (missing five years) in the Boston Public Library.   
11     .     .  See May and Sell (2006), p. 123.  The count of Standard subsidiary assignees here 
includes several inventions on non-refining inventions, of which numerous cases were found.  In 
1778 William Rockefeller, John D. Rockefeller's brother and business associate, took personal 
assignment on a non-refining invention.   
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to 1911, the number of U.S. patents assigned at the time of 
issue to U.S. corporations rose from 4,370 to 7,580, i.e., from 
17.1 to 23.1 percent of all patent issues.  Thus, although much 
less prevalent that in recent times, assignments were both 
common and rising in the latter years of Standard's monopoly.   
 
  During the period in question, Standard had an expressly 
articulated policy of rejecting unpatented inventions brought to 
its attention by independent inventors, but screening the 
patents of outside inventors and acquiring rights to those it 
considered attractive.  See Hidy and Hidy (1955), p. 288.  Given 
this, one might argue that Standard at least expressed a "demand 
pull" toward would-be petroleum process inventors, spurring 
their efforts, and perhaps acquiring many of the patents that my 
survey shows to have been assigned (i.e., at the time of issue) 
to independents.  On this, very little information exists, 
although the Hidys report  (p. 288) that no proposed outside 
improvement to the Frasch refining methods was considered worth 
pursuing.  To the Frasch contribution we now turn. 
 
  The Frasch Process 
 
  Standard's lawyers' briefs and the consensus of historians 
suggest that inventions by Hermann Frasch were the most 
important technological contribution by Standard during the last 
three decades of the 19th Century.  Allan Nevins (1953, vol. 2, 
p. 101) views the story of Frasch's invention as "one of the 
romances in the Standard annals."  Unfortunately, the many 
historical accounts are often quite inconsistent.  Nevins' 
complaint (1953, vol. 2, p. 443) that "A biography of Frasch yet 
remains much needed" continues even now to be valid.  My 
analysis here attempts to make sense of the conflicting 
evidence.
12 
 
  Demand-pull for the Frasch inventions emerged when John D. 
Rockefeller chose in the 1880s, contrary to his prior policy, to 
invest heavily in crude oil properties -- notably, in the 
vicinity of Lima, Ohio.  But the oil that began flowing from 
Lima wells proved around 1886 or 1887 to have a sulphur content 
quite unsuitable for refining into Standard's principal profit-
earners -- illuminating oil, or kerosene, and lubricating oil.  
Lima-based kerosene burned with an offensive "skunk oil" smell 
                                                 
12     .  It taps works listed in the References, several biographies of Frisch and William Burton 
found on the Worldwide Web, and an analysis of individual Frasch patents. 
 
5 
and blackened the glass surrounding lamp flames, reducing their 
illuminating efficiency.  Standard initially temporized by 
stockpiling Lima crude and then cultivating a demand for fuel 
oil, but that was a less profitable use of Ohio oil than 
refining kerosene would be -- if the technology necessary for 
sulphur elimination were at hand.  Standard's internal attempts 
to solve the problem were unsuccessful. 
 
   Hermann Frasch, born in Germany in late 1851, emigrated to 
the United States in 1868.
13  He studied and obtained a 
laboratory assistant's job in the Philadelphia College of 
Pharmacy and is said to have been fascinated by chemistry in 
general and the emerging petroleum technology in particular.  He 
saved enough money to establish his own chemical laboratory 
around 1873, pursuing inventions of his own choosing and also 
doing contract work for Philadelphia companies.  This work led 
inter alia to inventions underlying U.S. patent no. 205,792, 
applied for in August 1877 and issued in 1878.  Its focus was 
the "separation and treatment of oils," emphasizing what is now 
considered conventional fractional distillation.  It claimed 
elimination of undesirable odors from volatile ingredients, but 
not with methods that resembled Frasch's later desulphurization 
inventions. 
 
  Frasch's petroleum invention came to the attention of 
Standard Oil, and Frasch was apparently enlisted as a chemist 
with a Standard subsidiary in Cleveland, to which he migrated 
around 1877.
14   The nature of his duties in Cleveland has not 
been pinpointed in any of the definitive sources.  He made and 
patented several inventions from his Cleveland base, one on the 
"fractional distillation of oil" and one on the manufacture of 
waxed paper -- the wax coming from petroleum-based paraffin.  
None of the inventions was assigned to Standard Oil or any known 
affiliate of Standard; all but one went to Frasch personally 
without prior assignment.
15  Reminiscing on his experiences upon 
receiving the Perkins Medal in chemistry for 1912, Frasch makes 
no mention of his early tenure as a Standard employee (Frasch 
1912).  His Cleveland work relationship apparently ended around 
                                                 
13     .  His name was Anglicized to Herman during his U.S. residence. 
 
14     .  Frasch's first Cleveland-based patent was applied for in August 1877. 
 
15     .  The exception was assigned to J. B. Merriam of Cleveland.  Whether Merriam had a 
connection to Standard Oil is unknown. 
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1885.  What might best be characterized as a biographical novel 
claiming to draw upon private communications with co-workers, 
Heiss (1942, pp. 36-40) suggests that John D. Rockefeller was 
outraged when he realized later that Frasch's superiors failed 
to recognize the chemist's genius and make every effort to 
retain him and put him to work on problems critical to Standard 
Oil.
16 
 
  What is well established is that around 1885 Frasch 
purchased oil production and refining properties in Ontario and 
moved to London, Ontario.
17  The purchase was made at bargain 
prices because the Ontario oil proved to have a high sulphur 
content, leading to product failures and expensive law suits.  
Frasch went to work and solved the problem, proposing an array 
of metal oxides to absorb the sulphur and precipitate it from 
the refined oil.  On his invention he obtained, in addition to 
Canadian patents, a basic U.S. patent no. 378,246, applied for 
February 21, 1887, and issued in February 1888.  The invention 
quickly came to the attention of Standard Oil, which was 
urgently seeking solutions to its high-sulphur Lima problem.  
Standard purchased Frasch's company, Empire Oil, along with its 
desulphurization patent, apparently in an exchange of Standard 
Oil stock for Empire stock, from which Frasch is said to have 
become quite wealthy.  It also induced Frasch to return to 
Cleveland -- some accounts say at a considerable salary, some 
with compensation in Standard stock.  Most sources put the date 
of this transfer as 1886, which is inconsistent with the fact 
that U.S. patent 378,246 lists Frasch's residence as London, 
                                                 
16     .  An analogy to the history of AT&T is suggested.  Lee de Forest's triode electron tube 
(circa 1906) is widely considered one of the greatest inventions of all time, at least prior to 
conception of the transistor.  In 1899 and 1900 de Forest was employed in the laboratories of 
Western Electric, AT&T's manufacturing subsidiary.  His spare time work on wireless (radio) 
technology enraged his supervisor, who, according to de Forest's diary, exclaimed, "Look here, 
de Forest.  You'll never make a telephone engineer.  As far as I am concerned you can go to hell, 
in your own way.  Do as you damn please!"  De Forest reports that he "took him at his word, 
turned to my little corner where I had my spark gap and responder parts, and thereafter spent 
eight hours a day at my own delectable tasks, totally oblivious to the telephone work going on 
about me and for which I was supposed to be paid."  Maclaurin (1949) p. 72.  De Forest left for 
another job a month later. 
 
17     .  Williamson and Daum (1959, vol. 1, p. 616), apparently err in stating that Frasch was 
hired by the Imperial Oil Company of Canada.  They may have been confused (as I was initially) 
by the name of Frasch's Ontario company, Empire Oil, since there was also at the time a 
Standard Oil affiliate in Canada named Empire Refining Co. Ltd. 
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Ontario, which must have been true at least at the February 1887 
date of application.  That the underlying inventions were made 
independently and not under Standard employment is shown by the 
fact that Rockefeller paid a handsome price to acquire the 
Frasch properties and bring Frasch back into the Standard fold. 
 
  Frasch did begin intensive work on the sulphur problem.  
Early  results were disappointing, but by October 1888, the 
Frasch process yielded merchantable kerosene.  Work continued on 
alternative processing methods -- i.e., testing alternative 
metal oxides and means of recycling them, gaseous vs. liquid 
processing, and many equipment design variants -- improving 
yields and reducing costs.
18  Expenditures of approximately 
$200,000 on "the Herman experiment" were reported by Hidy and 
Hidy (1955, p. 165) -- a sum equivalent to more than $2 million 
at year 2000 wholesale price levels.  They yielded large returns 
to the Standard Oil companies, increasing the value of Lima oil, 
and were extended from the Lima refinery to Standard's giant new 
refinery at Whiting, Indiana, built in the early 1890s.
19 
 
  One of the many curiosities in the Frasch story is the 
choice of the name Frasch-Burton process in Standard Oil's 
defense against monopolization charges.  William M. Burton, who 
received his Ph.D. in 1889, did work briefly as Frasch's 
assistant in Cleveland, but only beginning in 1890, after the 
Frasch process had been proven successful.  Burton's main 
contribution appears to have been demonstrating to skeptical 
large-volume buyers that kerosene refined from Ohio oil was as 
free of sulphur as kerosene from Pennsylvania oil.  Or the 
designation could have been political, since Burton rose rapidly 
in the Standard organization and by 1895 was superintendent of 
its Whiting refinery. 
                                                 
18     .  The first U.S. patent resulting from Frasch's new work in Ohio was number 448,480, 
applied for in October 1889 and issued in March 1891.  It narrowed the set of oxides to copper 
and lead and reflected extensive experimentation. 
 
19     .  A remarkable fact difficult to reconcile with Alfred Chandler's emphasis on Standard 
Oil's success in securing economies of scale was that the Whiting, Indiana, refinery was designed 
to have 80 crude oil stills in order to achieve an unprecedented total capacity of 36,000 barrels 
per day.  See Hidy and Hidy (1955, p. 164).  A major source of petroleum refinery scale 
economies comes from the operation of the two-thirds rule in scaling up individual stills.  Best-
practice modern refineries operate stills with a daily throughput of 200,000 barrels.  Stills like 
those at Whiting in 1892 processing 450 barrels per day fell far short of this later condition.  
Compare Chandler (1990), pp. 21-25 and 93-96; with Scherer (1996), pp. 113-116. 
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  Frasch apparently continued to be employed by Standard Oil 
through much of the 1890s, assigning between 1891 and 1899 a 
total of 19 petroleum refining patents to Standard affiliates 
(mostly to Solar Refining, under which the Lima refinery 
operated) -- more than a third of all the patents traced to 
Standard Oil in my search covering the years 1875 through 1899.  
His conditions of employment must have been sufficiently 
flexible that, in the early 1890s, he began working on a problem 
well outside the articulated interests of Standard -- mining 
sulphur from swampy deposits in Louisiana.  From this research 
came a string of patents, the first three issuing in 1891, on 
what eventually came to be known as the Frasch process -- i.e., 
for extracting liquified sulphur from underground deposits 
through the injection of steam at high pressure.
20  All were 
issued to himself and not assigned to Standard Oil.  In his 
Perkins Medal address (1912, p. 138), Frasch reports that his 
early inventing and field experiments in Louisiana were "merely 
a hobby, the bulk of my time devoted to my Standard Oil work."  
In 1892, while still employed by Standard Oil, he organized the 
Union Sulphur Company, of which he became president.  Union 
Sulphur soon became the leading supplier of sulphur in the 
United States, displacing imports from Sicily and Japan almost 
entirely. 
 
 Evaluation 
 
  The evidence on what Standard Oil attorneys considered the 
company's most noteworthy technological accomplishment -- the 
Frasch process -- yields a mixed verdict on Standard's 
leadership.  The precipitating invention was made outside the 
Standard organization.  Standard did show good insight in buying 
the basic Frasch patent, and it plowed what were for the time 
substantial sums into perfecting the process.  My broader survey 
shows that relatively few patented inventions emerged from 
inventors who chose to assign, or whom Standard required to 
assign, their inventions to the company.  While the petroleum 
industry was expanding rapidly, the number of petroleum refining 
process patents stagnated, resuming a growth trajectory only 
after the divestiture of Standard into 34 segments following the 
Supreme Court's 1911 decision.   
 
                                                 
20     .  The first patent resulting from Frasch's desulphurization work at Lima also issued in 
1891. 
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  A more important negative indicator is the invention that 
was almost neglected.  While the Standard Oil monopolization 
case was proceeding, the petroleum refining industry was 
subjected to two technological revolutions.  The demand for 
kerosene illuminating oil -- Standard's principal early product 
-- was threatened by the advent of electric illumination, but 
the emergence of the automobile created demand for gasoline, 
which until then had been a nearly worthless by-product of the 
refining process.  In 1907, 8.0 percent of American homes were 
wired for electricity; by 1912, the figure had doubled and 
continued rising to 34.7 percent in 1920.  In 1907, 43,000 
passenger automobiles were produced; in 1912, 356,000; and after 
the first million-car year in 1916, factory sales reached 1.9 
million in 1920.  Using traditional methods, petroleum refiners 
were hard-pressed to extract enough gasoline to meet the 
burgeoning demand.  A new process for obtaining a much higher 
fraction of gasoline from a barrel of crude oil -- thermal 
cracking -- was invented around 1909 by William Burton, Frasch's 
former assistant and in 1909 head of production at Standard Oil 
Company of Indiana.  Indiana Standard applied to Standard 
headquarters in New York for authorization to spend $1 million 
developing and installing thermal crackers.  The request was 
turned down; the invention was considered too risky.
21  Only when 
Standard of Indiana became independent in 1912 could the project 
go forward.  The Burton process was widely licensed.  Between 
1913 and 1920, when competing cracking processes began to 
emerge, 91 million (42 gallon) barrels of gasoline had been 
refined using the Burton process.
22 
 
                                                 
21     .  See Yergen (1991), pp. 111-112; and Gibb and Knowlton (1956), pp. 116-117.  
22     .  Enos (1962), Appendix Table 1a. 
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